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WHY PROTECT UNAUTHORIZED WORKERS? IMPERFECT PROXIES, 
UNACCOUNTABLE EMPLOYERS, AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW’S 
FAILURES 
Angela D. Morrison* 
This Article explores a gap in the scholarship regarding the unauthorized 
workplace. It describes and names the two main justifications on which 
advocates and courts have relied to extend federal antidiscrimination 
protections to unauthorized workers. First, the proxy justification insists that 
workplace protections must include unauthorized workers because their 
protection is necessary to protect U.S. citizen and authorized workers. 
Second, the deterrence/accountability justification states that workplace 
protections must include unauthorized workers because it will deter 
employers from future violations of antidiscrimination laws and hold them 
accountable for violations of immigration law. While these justifications have 
led to some protection for workers, especially under federal 
antidiscrimination laws, unauthorized workers have still found themselves 
without full remedy. The existing scholarship attributes this to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB and its 
emphasis on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)’s 
prohibition on hiring unauthorized workers. 
This Article argues that attributing the lack of full remedy solely to 
Hoffman is an incomplete account. It ignores the role that antidiscrimination 
law’s two primary, normative principles play in the justification’s 
limitations. First, anticlassification’s status-neutral and individually-focused 
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principles exacerbate the stereotyping effects of the proxy justification, which 
results in limited access to remedies and misapplication of legal doctrines. 
Antisubordination also fails to achieve full protection for unauthorized 
workers. It can be difficult to get buy-in to the idea that workers who are 
unauthorized should be protected because antisubordination principles, 
unlike anticlassification principles, do not protect all workers regardless of 
status. Its historical reliance on immutability also means that courts and 
some policy makers may resist protecting unauthorized workers because they 
view immigration status as changeable. This also can lead to further 
stereotyping. Accordingly a fuller account of the unauthorized workplace 
shows that the proxy and accountability/deterrence justifications’ failure to 
fully protect unauthorized workers is not only the result of IRCA and 
immigration policy. The drawbacks of anticlassification and 
antisubordination principles lead to less robust protections for unauthorized 
workers, too.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The main justifications for protecting unauthorized workers under federal 
antidiscrimination laws have failed to provide full protection for those 
workers. Unauthorized workers are more vulnerable to unlawful 
discrimination in the workplace and face more challenges to claims-making 
under federal antidiscrimination laws than their authorized counterparts. The 
prevailing justifications that advocates and scholars’ have developed has 
contributed to this. But the justifications are not solely responsible for the 
lack of protections. The justifications developed in the context of existing 
antidiscrimination law. Antidiscrimination law’s two main normative 
principles made room for the gaps in protection that unauthorized workers 
face.  
The Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB held 
that a noncitizen worker who lacked immigration status was not entitled to 
remedy under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).1 The Court 
reasoned that awarding an unauthorized worker backpay under the NLRA 
would “subvert” the immigration enforcement goals of the Immigration 
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).2 Scholars have documented how this decision 
made unauthorized workers more vulnerable to workplace abuses.3  
Scholars and advocates, then, have focused on why, despite IRCA, 
federal workplace laws still protect unauthorized workers.4 Two main 
justifications have emerged. First, workplace protections must include 
unauthorized workers because their protection is necessary to protect U.S. 
citizen and authorized workers. I call this the proxy justification. Second, 
workplace protections must include unauthorized workers because it will 
 
1 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002). 
2 Id. at 149–50. 
3 See, e.g., Leticia M. Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, 93 N. 
CAR. L. REV. 1505 (2015); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized 
Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 193; Kathleen Kim, Beyond 
Coercion, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1558 (2015); Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the 
Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961 (2006); 
Kati L. Griffith, Undocumented Workers: Crossing the Borders of Immigration and Workplace 
Law, 21 CORNELL J. L. & POL’Y 611 (2012). 
4 See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 
AM. L. REV. 1361 (2009); Griffith, supra note 3; Angela D. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, Equitable 
Enforcement, and Exploited Immigrant Workers, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 297 (2017). 
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hold employers accountable and deter future violations of the workplace and 
immigration laws. I call this the accountability and deterrence justification. 
These justifications have led to some protection for workers, especially 
under federal antidiscrimination laws.5 Virtually every court to have 
considered the issue since Hoffman Plastics has found that unauthorized 
workers have standing to sue their employers for violations of federal 
antidiscrimination laws.6 But the proxy justification and the 
accountability/deterrence justification have resulted in unauthorized workers 
being less protected than their authorized counterparts. The proxy 
justification means that unauthorized workers only get treated the same as 
authorized workers up to a point. If the main reason to protect unauthorized 
workers is to protect authorized workers, then anything that implicates only 
the workers’ immigration status means that unauthorized workers will lose 
the protection the proxy justification provides.7 
The accountability/deterrence justification opens the door to two 
stereotypes that exist about unauthorized—that they are essentialized 
workers willing to take the jobs that authorized workers won’t, or that they 
are criminals who broke the law to take jobs from authorized workers. On the 
one hand, placing unauthorized workers in the role as victims of abusive 
employers potentially robs them of their agency and reinforces stereotypes 
about immigrant workers as an exploitable, subservient workforce.8 On the 
other hand, it also sets up a “comparative culpability analysis” that invites 
courts to view unauthorized workers as criminals and, therefore, less 
deserving of protection.9 Kathleen Kim has called this latter stereotype 
“complicity framing.”10 
This Article argues that the failures of the proxy and 
accountability/deterrence justification are not traceable only to IRCA and 
Hoffman. Instead, the normative underpinnings of federal antidiscrimination 
 
5 See discussion infra Part II.  
6 See discussion infra Part II. 
7 See, e.g., Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (denying 
full remedy to unauthorized workers because of their unauthorized status). 
8 Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 970 
(describing the stereotype of the subservient, immigrant worker); Jennifer J. Lee, Outsiders Looking 
In: Advancing the Immigrant Worker Movement Through Strategic Mainstreaming, 5 UT. L. REV. 
1063, 1070 (2014) (noting the dangers generally of relying on a narrative of unauthorized workers 
as passive victims). 
9 Kim, supra note 3, at 1580. 
10 Id.  
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law—anticlassification and antisubordination—can explain why the 
justifications fail to fully protect unauthorized workers who experience 
unlawful discrimination. Anticlassification’s status-neutral and individually-
focused principles exacerbate the proxy justifications’ role in making 
workers more vulnerable to attacks that they should be treated differently 
because they lack immigration status. That anticlassification theory is 
individually-focused also means it reinforces complicity framing. 
Antisubordination also fails to achieve full protection for unauthorized 
workers. It can be difficult to get buy-in to the idea that workers who are 
unauthorized should be protected because antisubordination principles, 
unlike anticlassification principles, do not protect all workers regardless of 
status. Its historical reliance on immutability also means that courts and some 
policy makers may resist protecting unauthorized workers because they view 
immigration status as changeable. This also can lead to further complicity 
framing.  
Thus, the proxy and accountability/deterrence justifications’ failure to 
fully protect unauthorized workers is not only the result of IRCA and 
immigration policy. The drawbacks of anticlassification and 
antisubordination principles lead to less robust protections for unauthorized 
workers, too. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, it describes IRCA and 
explains how IRCA’s enforcement has contributed to the vulnerability of 
unauthorized workers in the workplace. Part II introduces the proxy and 
accountability/deterrence justifications and demonstrates how courts have 
used those justifications to determine federal antidiscrimination laws apply 
to unauthorized workers. Part III outlines the limits of the justifications in 
terms of access to full remedy and increased vulnerability in the workplace. 
Part IV explains the antisubordination and anticlassification principles and 
how they have been used to justify antidiscrimination law and policy. In Part 
V, the article concludes that the antidiscrimination and antisubordination 
principles exacerbate and contribute to the proxy and 
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I. IRCA’S EMPLOYMENT BAN, ITS ENFORCEMENT, AND THE 
EMPLOYER RESPONSE 
Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 
1986.11 IRCA changed existing immigration law in three significant ways. 
First, it created a legalization program for individuals who have been in the 
United States without immigration status since 1982.12 Second, it reformed 
existing legal immigration programs, including creating the H2-A 
nonimmigrant visa for temporary agricultural workers,13 providing for 
adjustment of status for agricultural workers in the United States who 
performed seasonal agricultural work,14 and the visa waiver pilot program.15 
Finally, IRCA, for the first time, regulated the employer/employee 
relationship based on the employee’s immigration status.16 It barred 
employers from hiring workers who were in the country without 
authorization.17 
Congress relied on two main rationales to ban the employment of 
unauthorized workers. First, Congress sought to reduce irregular migration.18 
Many believed that that the United States served as a “jobs magnet” for 
unauthorized immigrants and that unauthorized immigration would decrease 
if Congress penalized employers who hired unauthorized migrants.19 Second, 
some in Congress also believed that the presence of unauthorized immigrants 
in the workforce “had significant negative effects for domestic workers, 
especially ‘low-income, low-skilled Americans, who are the most likely to 
 
11 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359. 
12 Id. § 201. The program is also known as the “Reagan Amnesty.” 
13 Id. § 301. 
14 Id. § 302. 
15 Id. § 313. 
16 Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, supra note 3, at 1506–07. 
17 IRCA § 101 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2018)). 
18 Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, supra note 3, at 1512; 
Wishnie, supra note 3, at 203 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I) (1986) and citing S. REP. NO. 99-
132 (1985)). 
19 See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 3, at 195 (citing U.S. Immigration Policy and the National 
Interest: The Final Report and Recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigration and 
Refugee Policy with Supplemental Views by Commissioners, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (Mar. 1, 
1981)); Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, supra note 3, at 1512–14. 
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face direct competition’ from the undocumented.”20 In sum, Congress hoped 
to deter extralegal migration and “safeguard[] wages and working conditions 
for U.S. workers.”21 
IRCA created an employment authorization regime which requires that 
employers verify an employee’s identity and work authorization status.22 The 
Act also imposes civil and criminal penalties on employers who fail to verify 
an employee’s identity and work authorization status, knowingly hire 
“unauthorized” noncitizens, or continue to knowingly employ unauthorized 
noncitizens.23 IRCA defines an unauthorized noncitizen24 as a noncitizen who 
“is not at that time either (A) . . . lawfully admitted for permanent residence, 
or (B) authorized to be so employed by this Act or by the Attorney 
General.”25 
Although IRCA does not impose criminal penalties for working without 
authorization, it includes provisions that penalize individuals who present 
fraudulent documents to obtain work.26 These sanctions are in addition to 
 
20 Wishnie, supra note 3, at 195 (quoting Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1985, S. REP. 
NO. 99-132 (1985)).  
21 Id. at 195–96, 203–04. Wishnie also notes that “there was a political rationale for employer 
sanctions.” Id. at 196. IRCA also included a legalization program that made three million people 
eligible for immigration status. Id. So, “IRCA promised both legalization and increased 
enforcement—politically something for all sides.” Id. 
22 IRCA § 101 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2018)). 
23 Id. (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2018)). 
24 This article uses the term “noncitizen” rather than “alien.” 
25 IRCA § 101 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (2018)). 
26 Id. § 103 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b) (2018)): 
(b) Whoever uses — 
(1) an identification document, knowing (or having reason to know) that the document 
was not issued lawfully for the use of the possessor, 
(2) an identification document knowing (or having reason to know) that the document is 
false, or 
(3) a false attestation, 
for the purpose of satisfying a requirement of section 274A(b) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, shall be fined in accordance with this title, or imprisoned not more than 
two years, or both. 
Noncitizens who violate this provision also face additional immigration penalties—they 
are inadmissible and removable.  
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immigration penalties for unauthorized work that the Immigration and 
Nationality Act already included.27 Still, as Leticia Saucedo notes, at the time 
that Congress passed IRCA, IRCA’s sanctions were “aimed at employers.”28 
Nonetheless, employers successfully lobbied to weaken some of IRCA’s 
sanctions and the federal government, for the most part, has focused its 
enforcement on employees, rather than employers.29 In response to 
employers’ lobbying, Congress amended the statute to allow employers to 
correct “technical or procedural” violations of IRCA’s document verification 
requirements.30 Employers who make “a good faith attempt to comply with 
the requirement” have ten days to fix the error after notice by the federal 
government.31 
One of the results has been uneven enforcement of IRCA’s provisions 
against employers. During the 1990s, audits of employers’ compliance with 
IRCA’s document verification program declined 77%, warnings to 
employers declined 62%, and final orders against employers in 
administrative proceedings declined 82%.32 From 2000 to 2014, although the 
numbers of final orders and civil fines against employers increased, the 
number of employers who were subject to fines were only .02% of employers 
in the United States.33 More recently, ICE has claimed that it increased 
employer audits by 340% in 2018 as compared to 2017.34 
Criminal prosecutions of employers are rarer. Between April 2018 and 
March 2019, only eleven employers were criminally prosecuted for 
 
Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) §§ 212(a)(3)(C), 237(a)(6)(C) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1227(a)(3)(C), 1182(a)(6)(C) (2018)). 
27 INA § 245(c)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2) (2018)) (prohibiting the adjustment of 
status of any noncitizen who continues in or accepts unauthorized employment). 
28 Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, supra note 3, at 1513. 
29 Id. at 1513–14. 
30 Id. at 1514 (citing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 411, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-666 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(6) 
(2018)). 
31 INA § 274A (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6) (2018)). 
32 Wishnie, supra note 3, at 209 (citing GAO statistics for the period from 1990 to 2003). 
33 ANDORRA BRUNO, CON. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION-RELATED WORKSITE 
ENFORCEMENT: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 4 (2015). 
34 ICE, HSI FY2018 Achievements, Worksite Enforcements (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.ice.gov/features/worksite-enforcement. 
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employing unauthorized workers.35 In 2015, the Congressional Research 
Service concluded that “[v]iewed more broadly, ICE administrative and 
criminal arrests in worksite enforcement operations represent a very small 
percentage of the potential population of violators.”36 Thus, on the one hand, 
IRCA’s prohibition on employing unauthorized workers is underenforced. 
On the other hand, legacy INS and ICE have consistently focused 
enforcement efforts on employees who violate IRCA’s fraudulent document 
provisions. Workplace raids during the Bush administration led mainly to the 
arrests of workers who used false documents to obtain work, leaving 
employers relatively unaffected.37 The same held true during the first term of 
the Obama administration.38 And that pattern has re-emerged under the 
Trump administration. In 2018, the Trump administration charged 666 
workers with criminal violations, an increase of 812% from the prior year.39 
A more recent workplace raid in Mississippi in 2019 resulted in the arrest of 
680 workers.40 To the extent that ICE has engaged in worksite enforcement, 
then, its efforts have largely centered on workers, not employers. 
The federal government’s subsequent under- and over-enforcement of 
IRCA’s provisions have created an opening for employers to develop an 
exploitable workforce; this results from both the criminalization of 
undocumented work and a perception of unauthorized workers as 
subservient.41 First, the de facto criminalization of unauthorized work makes 
the status of unauthorized workers more precarious.42 Because the 
government prosecutes workers for document-related crimes the “mere act 
 
35 TRAC Immigration, Few Prosecuted for Illegal Employment of Immigrants (May 30, 2019), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/559/. 
36 BRUNO, supra note 33, at 8. 
37 Kim, supra note 3, at 1574.  
38 Alan Gomez, Feds Targeting More Worksites Crack Down on Undocumented Workers but 




40 Henry Grabar, After ICE, SLATE (Aug. 18, 2019, 7:00 p.m.), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2019/08/ice-raids-mississippi-chicken-plants-aftermath-children.html. 
41 Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 970; Griffith, 
supra note 3, at 629–35; Wishnie, supra note 3, at 211–13; Morrison, supra note 4, 297, 321; Kim, 
supra note 3, at 1573–75.  
42 Kati L. Griffith & Shannon M. Gleeson, The Precarity of Temporality: How Law Inhibits 
Immigrant Worker Claims, 39 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 111, 121–22 (2017). 
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of working, which requires inventing or borrowing a Social Security number, 
also places unauthorized migrants at risk of arrest.”43 
And given employers’ role in the enforcement of immigration law 
through IRCA’s required document verification process, unauthorized 
workers may view their employers as part of the immigration enforcement 
regime.44 As a result, employers have more power over unauthorized workers 
who have used false identity documents to obtain their employment because 
they fear their employers will report them for criminal prosecution. 
Through her fieldwork, anthropologist Sarah Horton has documented the 
increased vulnerability that using false identity documents has created for 
unauthorized workers as compared to workers who are able to work 
unauthorized but under the table: 
[M]igrant farm-worker interviewees told me that 
unauthorized workers were not the most disadvantaged 
category of workers in the fields. As I conducted interviews 
about the causes of workplace accidents and why injured 
migrants chose not to pursue workers’ compensation claims, 
interviewees pointed to one particular category of worker as 
the most vulnerable: los que trabajan los papeles de otros 
(those who work under other people’s papers). Interviewees 
told me that it was this particular subset of unauthorized 
workers who did not take breaks, who did not report their 
injuries to supervisors, and who did not collect workers’ 
compensation when injured.45 
Workers become not only deportable but also what Horton terms 
“denounce-able.”46 Workers are denounce-able when they use false identity 
documents in the document verification process because at any moment they 
fear their employer could report them to ICE for criminal prosecution.47 Thus, 
 
43 Sarah B. Horton, From “Deportability” to “Denounce-ability:” New Forms of Labor 
Subordination in an Era of Governing Immigration Through Crime, 39(2) POLAR 312, 314 (2016). 
44 Griffith & Gleeson, supra note 42, at 123. 
45 Horton, supra note 43, at 315. 
46 Id. at 314. 
47 Id. at 314. Sarah Horton also describes the process through which individuals obtain false 
identity documents. Id. at 316–17. The workers she interviewed prefer “identity loan.” Id. Because 
the workers are concerned that buying false documents on the open market with a made-up social 
security number could inadvertently result in actual identity theft, the workers borrow a friend or 
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workers, at best, fear that they will lose their jobs, and, at worst, that their 
employers will report them to ICE should they complain about their working 
conditions.48 The result is that employer power in the workplace is 
enhanced.49  
Second, the vulnerability of unauthorized workers has created a 
perception among employers that unauthorized workers, particularly 
unauthorized Latinx workers, are more subservient.50 In turn, employers 
engage in practices that create “unwanted jobs” and target vulnerable workers 
for their perceived subservience.51 Employers have done this through 
network hiring, job structuring that leads to segregation through pay rates and 
conditions of employment, and hiring only perceived unauthorized workers 
for certain jobs.52 The vulnerability this creates has meant that unauthorized 
workers face pay discrimination, working conditions that are unsafe, 
harassment that includes sexual assault, and retaliation—all based on their 
national origin or sex. 53 
 
family member’s valid identity documents for the purposes of the employment verification process. 
Id. at 317. 
48 Griffith & Gleeson, supra note 42, at 123. 
49 Id. at 121. 
50 Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 970. 
51 Id. at 976–80. 
52 Id. at 976–80. As Saucedo notes, employers use national origin as a proxy for immigration 
status. Id. at 970. Accordingly, these practices include not just unauthorized workers, but Latinx 
workers as a whole. Id. 
53 See, e.g., Scott Soriano, The Rape Crisis Among California’s Farm Workers, CAPITOL 
WEEKLY (Jan. 9, 2020), https://capitolweekly.net/the-rape-crisis-among-californias-farm-workers/ 
(reporting that “nearly 51,000 farm worker women have been sexually assaulted or raped through 
coercion or blackmail” many of whom lack work authorization); Mica Rosenberg & Cristina Cooke, 
Allegations of Labor Abuses Dogged Mississippi Plant Years Before Immigration Raids, REUTERS 
(Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-koch-foods/allegations-of-
labor-abuses-dogged-mississippi-plant-years-before-immigration-raids-idUSKCN1UZ1OV 
(describing a suit a meat processing company settled with the EEOC for $3.75 million which 
included allegations that unauthorized workers were subjected to sexual and physical assaults, and 
threats to turn them over to immigration authorities if they complained); Eli Rosenberg, How a 
Worker Who Survived a Catastrophic Building Collapse Ended up in ICE Detention, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/11/25/how-worker-who-
survived-catastrophic-building-collapse-ended-up-ice-detention/ (describing an unauthorized 
worker who was placed in removal proceedings after reporting his employer for labor and safety 
violations).  I have previously collected cases and news articles in my scholarship. See Angela D. 
Morrison, Free Trade, Immigrant Workers, and Employment Discrimination, 67 KAN. L. REVIEW 
237, 240–41 nn. 13–16 (2018) (citing EEOC v. Global Horizon, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1059–65 
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In summary, IRCA made it unlawful for employers to hire unauthorized 
workers but did not make it unlawful for employees to work without 
authorization. Nonetheless, Congress has enacted laws that criminalize using 
false documents or misrepresenting one’s immigration status to obtain 
employment. The result has been underenforcement of IRCA against 
employers and overenforcement of criminal laws against unauthorized 
workers. In turn, unauthorized workers have been increasingly viewed as 
both criminal and as exploitable, thereby intensifying employer power in the 
unauthorized workplace. 
II. CURRENT JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROTECTING UNAUTHORIZED 
WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
LAWS 
Although unauthorized workers have successfully argued that they are 
protected under federal antidiscrimination laws, courts have failed to provide 
full protection to unauthorized workers. Just over a decade after Congress 
enacted IRCA, the Supreme Court decided Hoffman, in which it found an 
unauthorized worker was not entitled to backpay because of his unauthorized 
status.54 Advocates and scholars worked to develop legal justifications to 
 
(D. Haw. 2014) (alleging that the employer subjected Thai noncitizen workers to abusive terms and 
conditions of employment due to their national origin); SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR. & ALA. 
APPLESEED, UNSAFE AT THESE SPEEDS: ALABAMA’S POULTRY INDUSTRY AND ITS DISPOSABLE 
WORKERS 39–40 (2013) (describing workers in the Alabama Poultry Industry who reported 
harassment and dangerous and undesirable work assignments due to their national origin); 
SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 31–33 (2013) (describing noncitizen workers  with guest-worker status who experienced 
pay discrimination based on their national origin or gender); Sasha Khoka, Silenced by Status, Farm 
Workers Face Rape, Sexual Abuse, NPR (Nov. 5, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/2013/11/05/243219199/silenced-by-status-farm-workers-face-rape-sexual-
abuse (describing female, agricultural workers who were afraid to report sexual assaults because of 
their unauthorized status); Rape on the Night Shift (PBS Frontline 2015) (reporting about sexual 
assaults of noncitizen custodial workers); MARY BAUER & MÓNICA RAMIREZ, INJUSTICE ON OUR 
PLATES: IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY 22–29, 41–47 (2010) (describing retaliation, 
harassment, and wage theft that noncitizen women faced in the workplace)); See also Angela D. 
Morrison, Executive Estoppel, Equitable Enforcement, and Exploited Immigrant Workers, 11 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 297, 320–21 & 321 nn. 177 & 179 (2017) (collecting cases and media 
reports).  
54 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
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distinguish workers seeking protection under Title VII from workers seeking 
protection under the NLRA. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,55 prohibits employers from 
discriminating against workers on the basis of sex, race, national origin, 
color, or religion.56 Those protections include prohibitions on subjecting an 
employee to a hostile work environment or harassment, disciplining an 
employee, terminating an employee, or subjecting an employee to different 
terms or conditions of employment.57 Title VII similarly prohibits employers 
from retaliating against employees who exercise their rights under Title VII.58 
Other federal antidiscrimination statutes protect employees from 
discrimination on the basis of disability or age.59  
The Supreme Court has not addressed directly whether IRCA bars 
unauthorized workers from seeking relief under federal antidiscrimination 
laws. But the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds 
v. NLRB did address whether unauthorized workers could obtain relief for 
their employers’ violations of the National Labor Relations Act. 60 In 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, a group of workers had participated in a union 
organizing campaign at the company’s production plant.61 The company 
subsequently laid off the workers who participated in the campaign.62 The 
NLRB eventually determined that the company had laid off the workers 
because of their union organizing activities, a violation of the NLRA.63 The 
NLRB ordered the company to remedy the violation, including that the 
company reinstate and provide backpay to the workers it unlawfully laid 
off.64 
 
55 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 et seq. (2018). 
56 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
58 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
59 See generally Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101 et seq. (2012); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 621 et seq. (2012). 
60 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002). 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 140–41. 
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An administrative law judge held hearings to determine the amount of 
backpay the company owed to each worker.65 During the hearings, one 
worker testified that he lacked immigration status and admitted that he used 
someone else’s birth certificate to obtain the documents he needed to work 
in the United States.66 The NLRB awarded the worker backpay, reversing the 
ALJ’s decision to deny backpay, for the period from when the company laid 
off the worker to when it discovered the worker lacked immigration status.67 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court held the National Labor 
Relations Board lacked authority under the National Labor Relations Act to 
award backpay to an unauthorized worker.68 The Court pointed to IRCA to 
support its decision, writing “allowing the Board to award backpay to 
[unauthorized noncitizens] would unduly trench upon explicit statutory 
prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA.”69  
Subsequent to the Court’s decision in Hoffman, employers argued that 
federal antidiscrimination laws either do not apply to unauthorized workers 
because the employment relationship was not valid in the first instance70 or 
that Hoffman limits the remedy to which workers are entitled.71 For the most 
part, employers have been unsuccessful with the former argument72 and 
successful with the latter.73 Given the success of the latter argument, 
employers use the reasoning in Hoffman to argue that because the decision 
 
65 Id. at 141. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 141–42. 
68 Id. at 152. 
69 Id. at 151. 
70 See, e.g., Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 14–18, EEOC v. Restaurant Co., 490 
F. Supp. 2d 1039 (D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2006) (No. 05-1656) (arguing that employee lacked standing 
and was not an “employee” as defined by Title VII because employee was unauthorized). 
71 See, e.g., Def.’s Br. as to Pls.’ Emp. Based Remedies at 6–7, Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 344 
F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Okla. 2004) (No. 02-cv-85), 2004 WL 3342323. 
72 See, e.g., Iweala v. Operational Tech. Servs., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(employer unsuccessfully argued employee had no standing to bring Title VII claim because she 
was lacked immigration status); EEOC v. Restaurant Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (D. Minn. 2007) 
(employer unsuccessfully argued the EEOC did not have authority to bring suit because worker 
claiming discrimination was unauthorized); EEOC v. Phase 2 Invests., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 550 
(D. Md. 2018)(same). 
73 See, e.g., Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003); 
Restaurant Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; Phase 2 Invests., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 580. 
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limits the remedies to which unauthorized workers are entitled, discovery 
into workers’ immigration status is warranted.74 
When courts have determined workplace laws extend their protections to 
unauthorized workers, they have relied on two justifications.75 The first 
justification, the “proxy” justification, is that to ensure the protection of 
authorized workers, that is, United States citizens and noncitizens with 
authorization, in the workplace, workplace protections must extend to 
unauthorized workers.76 The second justification, the “deterrence and 
accountability” justification, looks at the impact on employers’ overall 
compliance with federal workplace laws.77 Under this justification, courts 
protect unauthorized workers because to do otherwise would allow 
employers to evade accountability and would fail to deter employers from 
engaging in discrimination in the future.78  
But the justifications do not provide full protection to workers, as 
described below.79 First, the justifications can increase vulnerability in the 
 
74 See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 17–19, 27–29, Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(No. 02–36155), 2003 WL 22670387. 
75 Morrison, supra note 4, at 297, 303–05, 312; This article looks at workers who fit within the 
antidiscrimination statutes’ definitions of “employee.” Many unauthorized workers do not meet the 
threshold definition of employee because they are relegated to contingent work. Geoffrey Heeren 
describes the gaps in IRCA that have resulted in unauthorized workers becoming subordinate in the 
workplace, “the primary impact of employer sanctions is not to ban unauthorized workers from 
working, but to relegate them to contingent positions where they do not receive the rights and 
protections that traditional employees take for granted.” Geoffrey Heeren, The Immigrant Right to 
Work, 31 GEO. IMM. L. J. 243, 246 (2017). He outlines three main exemptions in IRCA that allow 
employers to escape sanctions: (1) independent contractors are not employees under IRCA; 
(2) IRCA does not apply to self-employed entrepreneurs; and (3) sporadic, irregular, or intermittent 
domestic service in a private home is not considered employment under IRCA. Id. at 245–46. As a 
result, unauthorized workers in contingent positions do not enjoy the rights associated with a formal 
employment relationship, namely, “minimum wage and overtime, Social Security and other 
retirement benefits, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, collective bargaining rights, 
and the protection of federal antidiscrimination laws.” Id. at 246. 
76 Although no scholars have labeled this justification as the proxy argument, some scholars 
have described aspects of it when discussing the unauthorized workplace. Morrison, supra note 4, 
at 297, 312 (noting the chilling effect on U.S. citizen workers of failing to protect noncitizen 
workers); see also Lee, supra note 8, at 1076 (noting “the interpretive frame of the universal worker 
has also resonated with the courts by connecting the legal plight of immigrant workers to the greater 
good of all workers”); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 156 (2014). 
77 Morrison, supra note 4, at 297, 303–05. 
78 Id. at 297, 303–11. 
79 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
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workplace because they reinforce harmful stereotypes about unauthorized 
workers as either subservient or criminal. Second, the justifications result in 
limited access to remedies because the proxy justification only extends 
protections to unauthorized workers to the extent necessary to protect 
authorized workers.  
A. The Proxy Justification 
There are two strands to the proxy justification. First, failing to protect 
unauthorized workers from discrimination in a specific workplace will 
deteriorate employment conditions for all workers in that workplace. As 
Hiroshi Motomura has noted, “courts sometimes recognize that unauthorized 
workers have workplace rights and remedies because any other outcome will 
harm citizens and noncitizens who are working lawfully in the same 
workplace.”80  
Similarly, courts and advocates sometimes assert that allowing 
unauthorized workers to assert workplace claims protects citizen and 
authorized workers because it reduces unauthorized immigration over the 
long term.81 According to proponents of this justification, reducing 
unauthorized migration will result in more jobs for the authorized 
workforce.82 
Second, barring unauthorized employees from bringing claims would 
also chill others’ claims under federal antidiscrimination laws. This 
undermines all workers’ employment rights because federal workplace laws 
rely on workers to act as private attorney generals for enforcement.83 The 
court in EEOC. v. Restaurant, Co., relied, in part, on this justification when 
it determined that the plaintiff had standing to pursue her Title VII claim even 
though she was unauthorized.84 There, the employee alleged that her 
supervisor subjected her to a hostile work environment based on her sex and 
that her employer failed to promote her after she complained about her 
 
80 MOTOMURA, supra note 109. Motomura views this as “a strong sign that unauthorized 
workers are integrated into their workplaces.” Id. 
81 Stephen Lee explains this viewpoint without adopting it and instead questions whether 
granting workplace rights to unauthorized workers has reduced unauthorized migration. Stephen 
Lee, Screening for Solidarity, 80 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 225, 232–34 (2013). 
82 Id. at 233.  
83 Morrison, supra note 4, at 303–05, 311–15. 
84 EEOC. v. Restaurant, Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 (D. Minn. 2007). 
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supervisor’s harassment.85 The employer argued that the employee was not 
entitled to bring a Title VII claim because she “may be” unauthorized.86 In 
holding that unauthorized workers have standing to bring Title VII claims, 
the court wrote, “Congress intended to empower individuals to act as private 
attorneys general in enforcing the provisions of Title VII . . . . [A] ruling that 
undocumented workers could not pursue civil rights claims on their own 
behalf would likely chill these important actions.”87 
Courts rely on similar reasoning to bar discovery into employees’ 
immigration status.88 In Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s grant of a protective order that prohibited the employer from 
conducting discovery about the employees’ immigration status.89 The 
workers in Rivera were Latina and Southeast Asian women who had limited 
English proficiency.90 The employer required the women to take a basic job 
skills exam administered only in English, even though the women’s job 
duties did not require English proficiency.91 When the women did not 
perform well on the test, the employer demoted or transferred them to 
undesirable jobs, and eventually the employer fired them.92 During a 
deposition, the employer asked one of the women where she was married and 
born.93 Her attorney instructed her not to answer and requested a protective 
order to prevent inquiry into the women’s immigration status and into 
information likely to lead to discovery of the women’s immigration status.94 
When the court granted the protective order, it emphasized the chilling 
effect that allowing discovery would have on not just unauthorized workers, 
but also on authorized workers: “[e]ven documented workers may be chilled 
by the type of discovery at issue here.”95 It concluded that allowing discovery 
 
85 Id. at 1043–44. 
86 Id. at 1047. 
87 Id. 
88 See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). 
89 Id. at 1057. 





95 Id. at 1065. Other cases rely on similar reasoning that points out the impact on authorized 
employees’ reporting of Title VII violations. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kovacevich “5” Farms, No. 1:06-
cv-0165, 2007 WL 1599772, *3–*5 (E.D. Cal. June 4, 2007) (denying employer’s motion to compel 
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into immigration status would “unacceptabl[y] burden the public interest” in 
light of Title VII’s “dependence on private enforcement[.]”96 The U.S. 
district court for the District of Columbia adopted similar reasoning when it 
granted a protective order that barred the employer from discovery into the 
employee’s immigration status, writing the “chilling effect disadvantages all 
workers as it makes it less likely that discriminatory practices will come to 
light and be appropriately dealt with in a court of law.”97 
B. The Deterrence and Accountability Justification 
Deterrence and accountability as a justification stems from the idea that 
protecting unauthorized workers from unlawful discrimination is necessary 
to hold employers fully accountable under both antidiscrimination laws and 
IRCA.98 Moreover, accountability is important because it deters future 
violations of the law.99 In EEOC v. Restaurant Co., the court relied on 
deterrence and accountability when it found that unauthorized workers may 
bring Title VII claims, “[t]he Court also considers the need to reduce 
employer incentives to hire undocumented workers because of their inability 
to enforce their rights.”100 The Rivera court also highlighted accountability 
and deterrence as justifications for protecting unauthorized workers: 
“Congress has armed Title VII plaintiffs with remedies designed to punish 
 
responses to interrogatories that would result in information about employees’ immigration status); 
EEOC v. First Wireless Grp., 225 F.R.D. 404, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting protective order to 
bar inquiry into immigration status); EEOC v. Bice of Chi., 229 F.R.D. 581, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2005).  
96 Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1065–66.  
97 EEOC v. SOL Mexican Grill LLC, No. 18-2227, 2019 WL 2896933, at *2 (D.D.C. June 11, 
2019); See also EEOC v. Maritime Autowash, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 3d 662, 670 (J. Niemeyer, 
concurring) (concurring in decision to enforce EEOC’s subpoena to investigate allegations that 
employer discriminated against unauthorized worker based on national origin only because “the 
record plausibly suggests that the employer has engaged in a practice or pattern of discrimination 
that adversely affects other employees who are authorized to work in the United States.”). 
98 See, e.g., Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The Constitutionality of 
Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 431 (2011); Kathleen 
Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model of Enforcing the Civil Rights of 
Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 308 (2009); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra 
note 4, at 1374–75.  
99 Morrison, supra note 4, at 297, 303–05. 
100 EEOC. v. Restaurant, Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 (D. Minn. 2007). 
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employer who engage in unlawful discriminatory acts, and to deter future 
discrimination both by the defendant and by all other employers.”101 
Other courts have relied on the deterrence and accountability justification. 
In EEOC v. Maritime Autowash, Inc., the EEOC applied to enforce its 
administrative subpoena that sought information from an employer alleged 
to have discriminated against an unauthorized worker based on his national 
origin.102 The employee alleged that after he was hired, his manager told him 
that his name did not match his social security number.103 So the employee 
said that the manager told him to get new documents with a new name.104 
The employee did.105 After a DHS audit, the employee claimed the company 
owner and a manager gave all of the Hispanic employees $150 for a one-time 
bonus and said that they should use them to get new documents with new 
names.106 The employer rehired the employees.107 Subsequently, the 
employees complained to the employer that Hispanic employees faced 
“longer working hours, shorter breaks, lack of proper equipment, additional 
duties, and lower wages.”108 The employer fired them.109 
When the employer resisted the subpoena and the EEOC sought 
enforcement, the employer argued that the EEOC had no basis to issue the 
subpoena because an unauthorized worker had no “standing or right to seek 
remedies under Title VII[.]”110 The court rejected that argument writing, the 
employer “is asking the court for carte blanche to both hire [unauthorized 
workers] and then unlawfully discriminate against those it unlawfully hired. 
 
101 364 F.3d at 1067. 
102 EEOC v. Maritime Autowash, Inc., 820 F.3d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 2016). After the EEOC 
finished its investigation, it found cause to believe that the employer violated Title VII and filed a 
lawsuit against the company for discriminating against a class of employees on the basis of national 
origin and race. EEOC v. Phase 2 Invests., 310 F. Supp. 3d 550 (D. Md. 2018). The suit settled and 
resulted in a consent decree. EEOC, Maritime Autowash Will Pay $300,000 in EEOC Race and 
National Origin Discrimination Case (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/release/12-19-18.cfm?renderforprint=1. 





108 Id. at 664. 
109 Id. at 663. 
110 Id. at 664. 
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[The employer] would privilege employers who break the law above those 
who follow the law.”111 
Officials at the agencies that enforce antidiscrimination laws, also rely on 
this justification to refrain from asking workers about their immigration 
status. Shannon Gleeson interviewed government officials at state and federal 
agencies that enforce workplace rights, including the EEOC.112 When 
Gleeson asked an EEOC official why the agency did not ask claimants about 
their immigration status, he asserted that allowing employers to evade 
workplace laws would create incentives for employers to evade immigration 
laws: “if his agency were not allowed to enforce the rights of all workers, 
employers would be emboldened to hire undocumented workers solely ‘with 
the intent of exploiting them.’”113 And this would “reinforce the demand for 
undocumented labor.”114 
Relying on the proxy justification and the accountability/deterrence 
arguments has meant that advocates have been successful in arguing that 
federal antidiscrimination laws include in their protection unauthorized 
workers.115 Although these justifications lead to some workplace protections 
for unauthorized workers, they also limit the workers’ exercise of their rights. 
As the next section shows, these justifications ultimately harm the rights of 
unauthorized workers. They reinforce notions that unauthorized workers are 
less morally deserving of the court’s protection than authorized workers and 
subject unauthorized workers to scrutiny not faced by authorized workers 
seeking to assert their workplace rights.  
 
 
111 Id. at 668. In the subsequent litigation on the merits of the claim, the district court relied on 
the Fourth Circuit’s language, in part, to decide that discriminating against an unauthorized 
employee on the basis of race, national origin, or participation in an EEOC investigation is an 
unlawful practice under Title VII. EEOC v. Phase 2 Invs. Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 550, 579–80 (D. 
Md. 2018). The lower court also pointed to the importance of deterring other employers from 
engaging in similar conduct. Id. at 580. 
112 Shannon Gleeson, Means to an End: An Assessment of the Status-blind Approach to 
Protecting Undocumented Worker Rights, 57 SOCIO. PERSPECTIVES 301, 301 (2014). 
113 Id. at 310. 
114 Id. 
115 Morrison, supra note 4, at 302–20 (2017) (describing existing workplace protections for 
noncitizens under federal law). The only exception is that noncitizen workers do not receive the 
same protection from the Immigration Reform and Control Act’s (IRCA) unfair immigration-related 
employment practices. INA § 275B, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2018) (prohibiting employer discrimination 
against authorized employees on the basis of national origin and citizenship). 
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C. The Limits of Current Justifications for Protecting Unauthorized 
Workers 
Viewing unauthorized workers as proxies for United States citizen 
workers and authorized workers, may provide some protection for workers 
but it also makes unauthorized workers more vulnerable. Likewise, focusing 
on employer accountability and deterrence also results in unauthorized 
workers receiving less protection than authorized workers. First, the 
deterrence and accountability justification reinforces stereotypes about 
immigrant workers, and, unauthorized workers, in particular. It casts the 
unauthorized worker in either the role of the subservient and exploited 
worker, or as a criminal. Second, the proxy justification shifts the focus from 
the protected worker part of the employee’s identity to the unauthorized part 
of the employee’s identity. It emphasizes how unauthorized employees are 
different from authorized employees, that is, in the legality of their 
employment relationship in the first place. The result is more vulnerability in 
the workplace and limited access to remedies. 
1. More Vulnerability in the Workplace 
The narratives that flow from the accountability/deterrence justification 
result in more workplace vulnerability for unauthorizes workers. The 
narrative frames the harm as the employer’s failure to obey immigration laws 
not employment laws. Relying on a narrative that “focuses on immigrant 
workers as victims of criminal employers who fail to obey the rule of law”116 
can create “stereotypes and classes of outsiders, resulting in disfavoring 
immigrant workers who do not fit the role of the ‘good immigrant’—the 
iconic hard worker or victim.”117  
Three problems flow from this framing.118 First, it provides an incentive 
for employers to show that an employee is not a “good immigrant” because 
the employee violated criminal laws. It thereby emphasizes the viewpoint 
that unauthorized workers are criminals who broke the law to obtain 
 
116 Lee, supra note 8, at 1070. 
117 Id. at 1066; see also Rebecca Sharpless, “Immigrants are not Criminals”: Respectability, 
Immigration Reform, and Hyperincarceration, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 691, 706–11 (2016) (describing 
generally the limitations and harmful effects of the deserving/undeserving immigrant narrative). 
118 Lee, supra note 8, at 1096–101. 
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employment.119 As described below,120 that can lead to limited remedies in 
antidiscrimination claims, it also, as Lee notes, feeds into the general 
“criminalization hysteria” surrounding immigrants.121 This results in a cycle 
in which immigrant workers are targeted for enforcement actions rather than 
employers.122 Second, unauthorized workers “may have to act the part of the 
powerless victim to achieve results, although that may be contrary to their 
personal empowerment.”123 It can also mean that the abuse must be egregious 
enough that the workers can cast themselves as powerless victims.  
Third, casting unauthorized workers solely as victims of unscrupulous 
employers makes them into “essentialized workers who are divorced from 
their individual characteristics as human beings[.]”124 This plays into the 
stereotype of the subservient immigrant worker who will take the jobs that 
authorized workers will not—for lower wages and under more dangerous 
conditions.125 Employers, then, can take advantage of the stereotype and use 
it to justify their treatment of unauthorized workers, casting unauthorized 
workers as freely consenting to the conditions and lower wages.126 This 
narrative regularly appears in media reports about workplace raids. For 
example, in 2018, ICE conducted a raid on a worksite in Mount Pleasant, 
Iowa.127 ICE arrested thirty-two employees, but not the employer.128 NPR 
interviewed an employer in the town about unauthorized workers and the 
employer responded that businesses needed immigrant workers because 
businesses had difficulty filling jobs with authorized workers, “It is so hard 
to get people in the door just to sit down and interview . . . You’re afraid 
 
119 Id. at 1098. 
120 See supra Part II.B. 
121 Lee, supra note 8, at 1098.  
122 See generally Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, supra note 
3; Angela D. Morrison, Free Trade, Immigrant Workers, and Employment Discrimination, 67 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 237 (2018). 
123 Lee, supra note 8, at 1099. 
124 Id. at 1098. 
125 Id. at 1098–99; see also Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, 
supra note 3, at 970. 
126 Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 976–80; 
Kim, supra note 3, at 1580. 
127 Jim Zarroli, With Workers Hard to Find, Immigration Crackdown Leaves Iowa Town in a 
Bind, NPR (May 21, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/21/725096578/with-workers-hard-to-
find-immigration-crackdown-leaves-iowa-town-in-a-bind. 
128 Id. 
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you’re going to scare them off. Any little thing that you do, they won’t show 
up for the first day of work.”129 Other recent media reports reflect the same 
narrative. A New York Times article had the following lede: “As a tight labor 
market raises costs, employers say the need for low-wage help can’t be met 
by the declining ranks of the native-born.”130 And after workplace raids in 
poultry processing plants in Mississippi in 2019, people in the towns affected 
by the raids reported that they didn’t believe that workers who were U.S. 
citizens would remain in the jobs because “of the simple fact that the jobs are 
hard . . . [i]t’s something they didn’t see themselves doing growing up. 
Something they don’t want to do” and “American-born residents ‘didn’t want 
to work, period.’”131 These narratives reinforce the stereotype that 
unauthorized workers will take jobs that authorized workers will not—at 
lower wages and under more dangerous conditions. 
In short, the justifications play into stereotypes about unauthorized 
workers. Because of their unauthorized status, they are viewed as 
lawbreakers, on the one hand, but because of their employers’ actions they 
are viewed as exploitable victims, on the other hand. The stereotypes work 
to shore up the employer-created narratives that unauthorized workers 
consent to unequal work conditions, including harassment, low wages, and 
unsafe work environments. 
2. Limited Access to Remedies 
The proxy justification has led to limited access to remedies. It has 
resulted in the misapplication of the after acquired evidence doctrine and the 
mixed motive defense. And that misapplication matters because it has chilled 
employees from pursuing their workplace rights in the first instance or in 
foregoing full remedy for their employers’ violations. The misapplication of 
doctrines in the Title VII context stands in contrast to how courts apply 
similar doctrines in the FLSA context.  
 
129 Id. 
130 Eduardo Porter, Short of Workers, U.S. Workers Builders and Farmers Crave More 
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/business/economy/immigration-labor-economy.html. 
131 Richard Fausset, After ICE Raids, a Reckoning in Mississippi’s Chicken Country, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/us/mississippi-ice-raids-poultry-
plants.html. 
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The difference between authorized workers and unauthorized workers has 
resulted in courts misapplying legal doctrines, such as the after-acquired 
evidence doctrine and Title VII’s mixed motive defense. In Title VII 
litigation, employers may assert a defense to limit liability for illegally 
terminating an employee when they subsequently learn that an employee 
engaged in employment-related misconduct.132 Normally, an employer must 
prove “by a preponderance of the evidence” that it would have terminated the 
employee had it known about the misconduct.133 When an employer 
successfully proves that it would have fired the employee, front pay and 
reinstatement become unavailable to the employee, and backpay is limited to 
the period prior to the employer discovering the misconduct.134 But some 
courts have used the doctrine to limit recovery despite the difficulty of 
proving that the worker’s unauthorized status would have resulted in the 
worker’s termination or to bar a plaintiff’s claims entirely because the 
employee lacked work authorization.135 Thus, courts’ focus on the 
unauthorized status of the workers short-circuits the burden of proof that the 
court would require if the employee were authorized. 
Another doctrine that courts misapply to unauthorized workers is the 
mixed motive defense. If an employer’s actions were motivated both by a 
discriminatory reason and another non-discriminatory reason, an employer is 
still liable under Title VII.136 However, an employer may avoid damages and 
some equitable relief if the employer proves that it would have taken the 
unlawful employment action anyways because of the nondiscriminatory 
reason: 
 
132 Christine N. Cimini, Undocumented Workers and Concepts of Fault: Are Courts Engaged 
in Legitimate Decisionmaking?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 389, 445 (2012). 
133 Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2004). 
134 Joseph Spadola, An Ad Hoc Rationalization of Employer Wrongdoing: The Dangers of the 
After-Acquired Evidence Defense, 102 CAL. L. REV. 691, 696 (2012). 
135 Cimini, supra note 132, at 445–47. 
136 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018). Regarding the mixed motives analysis, the statute provides: 
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in 
employment practices 
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other 
factors also motivated the practice. 
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(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation . . . 
and [an employer] demonstrates that the [employer] would 
have taken the same action in the absence of the 
impermissible motivating factor, the court— 
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as 
provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs 
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of 
a claim . . . ; and 
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any 
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or [backpay].137 
Under this doctrine, then, the employer should be required to show that it 
took the action, in part, because of the worker’s unauthorized status. 
But some courts have not required that employers show they took the 
action because of the employee’s status, and instead have determined that the 
unauthorized status, itself, forecloses backpay. For example, although the 
court in Escobar v. Spartan Security Service138 held that Title VII applied to 
an employee who was unauthorized when he worked for the employer,139 the 
court determined the employee could not recover backpay for the period 
during which he was not authorized to work.140 Other cases similarly have 
found that the EEOC may not seek backpay or reinstatement when the 
employee is unauthorized.141 In these cases, the court did not require the 
employer to prove that it would have taken the action because of the workers’ 
immigration status or that it was motivated, in part, by the workers’ status.142 
Moreover, because the cases involve hostile work environments, it would be 
difficult if not impossible, for the employers to make that showing.   
The misapplication is significant because it disincentivizes workers from 
bringing claims. Lack of immigration status chills workers from bringing 
 
137 Id. § 2000e-5(g)(B)(2)(ii). 
138 Escobar v. Spartan Security Service, 281 F. Supp. 2d 895 (S.D. Tex. 2003). 
139 Id. at 897. 
140 Id.; see also EEOC v. Restaurant Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1047 (D. Minn. 2007) (noting 
that while unauthorized workers have standing to sue for Title VII violations, they may be precluded 
from “certain remedies.”). 
141 See, e.g., EEOC v. Phase 2 Invs. Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 550, 580 (D. Md. 2018). 
142 Id. 
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claims in the first place,143 but the lack of remedy further deters workers. As 
Kati L. Griffith and Shannon M. Gleeson note “unauthorized employees are 
also disincentivized from claiming because there is little clarity about 
whether they have the same rights to monetary remedies . . . as compared to 
their authorized counterparts.”144 It matters that courts have prevented 
unauthorized workers from achieving full remedy because it prevents them 
from bringing claims. 
In other cases, the EEOC or the worker pre-emptively decide not to 
pursue remedies to avoid discovery into the worker’s immigration status.145 
In EEOC v. DiMare Ruskin, the EEOC alleged that supervisors subjected two 
female farmworkers to a hostile work environment because of sex. 146 The 
conduct included one supervisor telling one of the women that he wanted to 
kiss her all over, including her breasts, and that he would never stop pursuing 
her; it also included one supervisor forcing one of the woman’s hand to his 
crotch.147 The EEOC moved for a protective order to bar the employer from 
asking about the employees’ immigration status.148 The court granted it.149 
As part of its reasoning, the court wrote, “[t]his case deals with sexual 
harassment and unlawful termination for refusing to comply with a 
supervisor’s sexual advances. All individuals, both citizens and immigrants, 
 
143 Griffith & Gleeson, supra note 42, at 121–22 (summarizing the literature and citing Shannon 
M. Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker Claims 
Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 563, 594 (2010); SHANNON M. GLEESON, PRECARIOUS 
CLAIMS: THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 125–
27 (2016); SUNAINA MAIRA, RADICAL DEPORTATION: ALIEN TALES FROM LODI AND SAN 
FRANCISCO IN THE DEPORTATION REGIME: SOVEREIGNTY, SPACE, AND THE FREEDOM OF 
MOVEMENT 301 (Nicholas DeGenova & Nathalie Peutz eds., 2010)). See also Leticia M. Saucedo, 
Immigration Law Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for Integrated 
Protections in the Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303, 310 (2010) (describing how fear of 
detection makes unauthorized workers afraid to report discrimination in the workplace); Jayesh M. 
Rathod, Beyond the “Chilling Effect”: Immigrant Worker Behavior and the Regulation of 
Occupational Safety & Health, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 267, 271–74 (2010). 
144 Griffith & Gleeson, supra note 42, at 124. 
145 See, e.g., EEOC v. DiMare Ruskin, Inc., 2:11-CV-158, 2012 WL 12067868 at *2 (M.D. Fla. 
Feb. 15, 2012). 
146 Id.  
147 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at *4–5, EEOC v. DiMare Ruskin, Inc., 2:11-CV-158, 
2012 WL 12067868. 
148 DiMare Ruskin, 2012 WL 12067868, at *3. 
149 Id. at *5. 
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are protected from unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII.”150 
But the court premised its grant on the workers’ foregoing their right to 
backpay, reinstatement, or front pay, concluding “since [the workers] are not 
seeking backpay, front pay, or reinstatement, the [workers’] immigration 
status is irrelevant as to damages calculations.”151 Thus, plaintiffs often do 
not seek the full array of available remedies when they do bring claims. They 
forego seeking backpay, front pay, and reinstatement;152 all of which are 
remedies to which successful Title VII plaintiffs are entitled.153 
In contrast, unauthorized workers who pursue claims under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA),154 are not subject to the same limitations.155 For 
example, in Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld the district court’s judgment as a matter of law in which the lower 
court had awarded actual and liquidated damages to unauthorized workers 
who had proved their employer violated the FLSA.156 The employer had 
argued that the doctrine of in pari delicto, “which states that ‘a plaintiff who 
has participated in wrongdoing may not recover damages resulting from the 
wrongdoing’” barred one of the workers from recovering liquidated damages 
because he had used a false social security number when he applied for the 
job.157 The in pari delicto doctrine is similar to the after-acquired evidence 
and mixed motive defenses in that it focuses on employee wrongdoing to 
limit employer liability, and the employer bears the burden of proof.158 To 
 
150 Id. (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973)). 
151 Id.  
152 See EEOC v. SOL Mexican Grill LLC, No. 18-2227, 2019 WL 2896933, at *4 (D.D.C. June 
11, 2019) (noting that the EEOC explained it was “not ‘seeking back pay, front pay, or 
reinstatement’”); see also Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (“No backpay 
award has been authorized in this litigation. Indeed, the plaintiffs have proposed several options for 
ensuring that . . . no award of backpay is given to any undocumented [noncitizen] in this 
proceeding.”). 
153 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). 
154 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), Pub. L. 75–718, (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 203). 
155 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Pie of Port Jefferson Corp., 48 F. Supp. 3d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(barring discovery into immigration status because FLSA permitted and IRCA did not prohibit 
unauthorized workers from seeking backpay as a remedy under FLSA). 
156 Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, 711 F.3d 1299, 1299 (11th Cir. 2014). 
157 Id. at 1306. 
158 See id. at 1308 (stating that the in pari delicto analysis requires a focus on the wrongdoing 
of the employee). 
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succeed under the doctrine, an employer must demonstrate two things: (1) the 
employee “bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the violations 
he seeks to redress, and (2) preclusion of the suit would not substantially 
interfere with the statute’s policy goals.”159 Rejecting the employer’s 
argument, the court reasoned that the worker’s use of a false social security 
number did not show that the worker bore responsibility for the FLSA 
violation because the misrepresentation had nothing to do with the 
employer’s failure to comply with the FLSA.160 
Moreover, just as courts in Title VII litigation use the proxy and the 
accountability/deterrence justifications, so too do courts in FLSA litigation. 
For example, in Zeng Lui v. Donna Karan International, Inc., the court cited 
the chilling effect that allowing discovery, even if relevant, into the workers’ 
immigration status would have on plaintiffs in the future.161 And in Lucas v. 
Jerusalem Café, LLC, the court reasoned that unauthorized employees could 
seek remedy under the FLSA because it was necessary to hold employers 
accountable under both IRCA and the FLSA.162 Accordingly, courts in FLSA 
cases rely on the same justification as courts in Title VII cases, but 
unauthorized workers in FLSA cases do not experience the same limited 
access to remedies. 
 Why do the justifications lead to full access to remedies under the FLSA, 
but limited access under Title VII? The different treatment could be attributed 
to the difference in backpay under the FLSA as compared to backpay under 
Title VII. Under the FLSA, the court awards backpay for work already 
performed,163 while under Title VII, the court awards backpay as make-whole 
 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 1308–09; see also Vallejo v. Azteca Elec. Constr., Inc., No. CV-13-01207-PHX-NVW, 
2015 WL 419634 at *5 (D. Ariz. 2015) (rejecting employer defense of in pari delicto based on 
worker’s unauthorized immigration status). Cf. Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 
2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting protective order that barred discovery into noncitizen’s 
immigration status because immigration status is irrelevant to FLSA claims); Rengifo v. Erevos 
Enters., Inc., No. 06 Civ. 4266(SHS)(RLE), 2007 WL 894376, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2007) 
(same).  
161 207 F. Supp. 2d at 193 (“[T]here would still remain ‘the danger of intimidation, the danger 
of destroying the cause of action’ and would inhibit plaintiffs in pursuing their rights.”). 
162 Lucas v. Jerusalem Café, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 936–37 (8th Cir. 2013); see also Colon v. 
Major Perry St. Corp., 987 F. Supp. 2d 451, 462–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding unauthorized workers 
may seek remedy under the FLSA because to do otherwise would provide incentives for employers 
to violate FLSA and IRCA). 
163 Lamonica, 711 F.3d at 1308. 
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relief for work that the worker would have performed but for the employer’s 
discriminatory action.164 Also, under the FLSA, a court must award backpay 
when a worker proves a violation, while under Title VII, the court may award 
backpay in its discretion.165 But as the Court emphasized in Albemarle Paper 
Co., Inc. v. Moody, courts should rarely deny backpay in a Title VII case and 
the presumption is that courts will award backpay as part of the statutory 
scheme to make workers whole.166 In effect, then, courts should approach the 
award of backpay under Title VII and the FLSA similarly. 
Moreover, just like Title VII, the FLSA provides for both legal and 
equitable remedy: 
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 
215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or 
equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the 
purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without 
limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the 
payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as 
liquidated damages.167  
Thus, to the extent that the availability of equitable relief opens the door 
to discovery into immigration status or allows complicity framing, it would 
be expected that courts would find immigration status relevant but too 
prejudicial or bar relief to equitable relief based on the workers’ unauthorized 
status. But, as described above, that is not what courts are doing. What 
explains the different treatment? One explanation may lie in the normative 
underpinnings of antidiscrimination law, in particular, anticlassification 
principles.  
 
164 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (“[T]he court may . . . order such affirmative action as may 
be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with 
or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay 
liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the 
Commission.”). 
165 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416–18 (1975).  
166 Id. at 421 (“It follows that, given a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay should be 
denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory 
purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for 
injuries suffered through past discrimination.”).  
167 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
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III. THE ANTICLASSIFICATION AND ANTISUBORDINATION 
FRAMEWORKS 
The antisubordination and anticlassification theories evolved as ways to 
explain the normative values that underlie equal protection and 
antidiscrimination law generally.168 Scholars who focus on workplace 
discrimination law have borrowed from anticlassification and 
antisubordination scholarship to describe the normative goals of Title VII and 
other federal antidiscrimination in employment laws.169 In effect, 
 
168 Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification 
or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (“Both antisubordination and 
anticlassification might be understood as possible ways of fleshing out the meaning of the 
antidiscrimination principle, and thus as candidates for the ‘true’ principle underlying 
antidiscrimination law”); see also Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 UNIV. OF 
CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971) (describing first the antisubordination and anticlassification frameworks in 
the context of employment laws); Samuel R. Bagnestos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
169 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 168, at 265; Bagnestos, supra note 168, at 41; Catherine Fisk, The 
Anti-Subordination Principle of Labor and Employment Law Preemption, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 17, 44 (2011); Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 955 (2012); see also Stephanie Bornstein, 
Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 544 (2018) (stating “the debate over how to 
balance anticlassification and antisubordination principles has dominated much of the discussion of 
antidiscrimination law” and arguing that a third principle, antistereotyping, is emanant in 
antidiscrimination law). 
 This article separates the antisubordination and anticlassification frameworks for ease of 
analysis. However, antidiscrimination scholars have noted that the two theories often work in 
tandem to support antidiscrimination norms. See, e.g., Areheart, supra, at 963 (noting that the two 
theories often overlap and are not neatly categorical). As Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel explain, at 
the time that Owen Fiss articulated the antisubordination theory,  antidiscrimination scholars 
“understood the anticlassification and antisubordination principles to have divergent practical 
implications for the key issues of the moment: The anticlassification principle impugned affirmative 
action, while legitimating facially neutral practices with a racially disparate impact, while the 
antisubordination principle impugned facially neutral practices with a racially disparate impact, 
while legitimating affirmative action.” Balkin & Siegel, supra note 168, at 12.  
 Nonetheless, scholars subsequently have noted that they overlap and that they do not always 
serve cross-purposes. Mary Anne Case offers two examples of how the anticlassification and 
antisubordination worked together to support arguments that prohibiting same-sex marriage was a 
form of sex discrimination and that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination. Mary 
Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination as a 
Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1473–74 (2000). Some scholars argued that 
prohibiting same sex marriage was sex discrimination because “restricting entry into marriage to 
two persons of different sexes had the intent and effect of subordinating women.” Id. at 1473. As 
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anticlassification views the normative goal of federal antidiscrimination laws 
as achieving a status-neutral workplace, that is, one in which employers do 
not take an individual’s membership in a particular group into account when 
making decisions.170 Antisubordination theory, on the other hand, theorizes 
that to achieve antidiscrimination law’s equality goals, policy makers must 
take status into account.171 Because historic structural inequity has created a 
lack of opportunities and employers act on unconscious biases, 
decisionmakers must consider how membership in a subordinated group has 
impacted opportunity to effectively remedy discrimination.172 
A. Anticlassification Theory 
Under the anticlassification framework, society will have achieved 
equality when individuals are no longer categorized based on their racial, 
gender, ethnic, or other identity.173 It prohibits decisionmakers from giving 
any group preferential treatment. Under an anticlassification framework, 
preferential treatment such as affirmative action programs would exacerbate 
the goal of antidiscrimination laws.174 How society historically has treated 
the group is irrelevant.175 Anticlassification theory’s normative goal is a 
color- and sex- blind society.176  
Anticlassification theory’s focus is on individual rights—both with 
respect to the employer discriminating and the employee who has suffered 
 
Case points out, the argument not only relies on the subordinating effect on women, but also on the 
idea that the constraint of the full expression of “human emotions, behavior and relationships” 
injures everyone—not just women. Id. at 1473 n.130 (citing Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the 
Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 188, 232 (1988)). Regarding pregnancy 
discrimination, scholars argued for “an androgynous prototype” with sex-neutral rules, but the 
purpose of those rules was to “get the court out of the business of reinforcing traditional sex-based 
family roles and to alter the workplace so as to keep it in step with the increased participation of 
women.” Id. at 1474 (quoting Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal 
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 352 (1985)). 
170 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
171 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
172 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
173 Areheart, supra note 169, at 963–64; see also Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: 
Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1986) (describing the framework 
as “anti-differentiation”). 
174 Areheart, supra note 169, at 963. 
175 See id. 
176 See generally, id. at 963–64; Colker, supra note 173, at 1006. 
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the discrimination.177 First, it focuses on the employer’s motivation and does 
not consider the structural issues in society that have created the opportunity 
for discrimination178 Second, it looks at how the discrimination affected the 
individual who was discriminated against and not at the group effects of the 
discrimination.179 Accordingly, discrimination is unlawful under the 
anticlassification theory when it arises from “invidious motivation” and 
similarly situated individuals are treated dissimilarly.180 
Title VII can be read as an anticlassificationist law. Most obviously, Title 
VII makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against workers because 
of the workers’ sex, race, color, religion, or national origin.181 It even 
explicitly prohibits employers from “classif[ying] [their] employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect [the employee’s] status as an employee, because of” a protected 
characteristic.182 This language is anticlassificationist on its face.183 And the 
Supreme Court acknowledged Title VII’s anticlassification principles in 
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. when it determined that Title 
VII “prohibits racial discrimination in private employment against white 
persons upon the same standards as racial discrimination against 
nonwhites.”184 
There are at least four explanations for why courts and policy makers 
have grounded antidiscrimination policy in anticlassification theory. First, 
 
177 Colker, supra note 173, at 1005–06. 
178 Id. at 1005; see also Llezlie Green Coleman, Disrupting the Discrimination Narrative: An 
Argument for Wage and Hour Laws’ Inclusion in Antisubordination Advocacy, 14 STANFORD J. 
CIV. R. & CIV. LIB. 49, 71 (2018) (noting that proving discrimination under Title VII is more 
complicated than proving wage theft under FLSA because Title VII’s formal equality structure 
requires plaintiffs to prove discriminatory motive on the part of the employer). 
179 Colker, supra note 173, at 1005. 
180 Id. at 1005–06. 
181 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). 
182 Id. 
183 Areheart, supra note 169, at 969. Although, as described below, Title VII’s language can 
also be read as focusing on antisubordination goals, it is unlawful to deprive employees of 
employment “opportunities” on the basis of one of the protected categories. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
As described below, infra Part III.B, antisubordination theory has as one of its goals, not just equal 
treatment, but equal opportunity. 
184 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280, 286 (1976), cited by Areheart, 
supra note 169, at 969–70. 
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anticlassification theory appeals to policy makers and courts because it seems 
to represent a “basic notion of fairness” that is easy to administer.185 Treating 
everyone the same, regardless of their individual traits or characteristics, is 
easier than effecting substantive equity for subordinated groups.186 The 
Court’s reasoning in Young v. United Parcel Service187 is an example of the 
Court effectuating formal equality over substantive equality.188 In Young, the 
employer did not allow a pregnant employee, whose doctor imposed lifting 
restrictions, to work due to the restrictions.189 The employee alleged that the 
employer had accommodated other employees who had non-pregnancy-
related lifting restrictions but failed to accommodate her lifting 
restrictions.190 The Court held that pregnant employees could state a prima 
facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII if they show an “employer 
accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to 
accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers.”191 So, while Title VII 
mandates that employers must treat employees equally, employers do not 
have to create targeted programs that benefit workers who have 
vulnerabilities that make the workplace more challenging for them than their 
co-workers.192 As long as the employer treats all employees the same, the 
employer has not unlawfully discriminated. 
Second, the anticlassification principle can appear to be value neutral.193 
It treats the harm of discrimination as the same for everyone.194 Since the 
harm is the same, courts can treat individuals the same, including in their 
 
185 Areheart, supra note 169, at 996. 
186 Id. (citing David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual 
Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1777–78 (2002)). 
187 Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
188 This example comes from Trina Jones. Trina Jones, Title VII At 50: Contemporary 
Challenges for U.S. Employment Discrimination Law, 6 ALA. CIV. RIGHTS & CIV. LIBERTIES L. 
REV. 45, 71 (2014). 
189 135 S. Ct. at 1344. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1354. 
192 Jones, supra note 188, at 71. Of course, the ADA does require employers to make reasonable 
accommodations for workers who have a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. 
193 Areheart, supra note 169, at 997. 
194 Id. at 998–99. 
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access to remedy and distribution of remedy.195 Third, if the law benefits 
everyone equally, then it is more likely to gain widespread support among 
the public.196 When individuals can see that they stand to benefit directly 
from the law, they are more likely to support it.197 The public also is more 
likely to support a law that equally benefits everyone because it avoids a 
perception that some people benefit from the law at the expense of others. 198 
An example of this is the backlash against the ADA and the ADA 
Amendments Act (ADAAA).199 Since the ADA and ADAAA protections 
apply only to individuals with a qualifying disability, their scope is limited.200 
This can result in a perception that the ADA and ADAAA are programs that 
provide special benefits to a minority group at the expense of those not in the 
group.201 
Finally, anticlassification theory does not require policy makers and 
courts to grapple with the structural causes of discrimination. It does not 
assign fault, other than to the individual decisionmaker who acted 
discriminatorily.202 Because the discrimination is the sole fault of the 
individual decisionmaker, policy makers and courts do not have to 
acknowledge the continued, systemic subordination of particular groups.203 
 
195 Id. (quoting Matthew Scutari, Note, “The Great Equalizer”: Making Sense of the Supreme 
Court’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence in American Public Education and Beyond, 97 GEO. L.J. 
917, 928–29 (2009)). 
196 Id. at 997–98. 
197 Id. 
198 Areheart, supra note 169, at 998.  
199 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12101–12113); Michelle A. Travis, Disqualifying Universality Under the Americans With 
Disabilities Act Amendment Act, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1689 (2015). 
200 Areheart, supra note 169, at 998 (citing Michelle A. Travis, Lasing Back at the ADA 
Backlash: How the Americans With Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 
TENN. L. REV. 311, 312 (2009)). 
201 Travis, supra note 199, at 1756–58. Travis does not use the term “anticlassification” but 
instead uses the term universal; she argues that the ADA and ADAAA are statutes that provide 
universal protection, but because of employers’ efforts and lobbying, courts have narrowed the 
definition of a “qualified individual” to sort out and narrow the application of the ADA and ADAAA 
to people who should otherwise qualify for the statutes’ protections. Id. at 1750–59. 
202 Areheart, supra note 169, at 999 (quoting Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A 
Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1711 (2005)). 
203 Id.; see also Jones, supra note 188, at 73 (“It is simply more pleasant and easier all around 
to think that we are, or have obtained, our better selves, than to continue the hard and challenging 
work of grappling with our continuing imperfections.”). 
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As Llezlie Green Coleman notes, advocates and scholars have adopted this 
approach because it is “more palatable within the eagerly-embraced ‘post-
racial’ narrative.”204  
B. Antisubordination Theory 
Antisubordination theory presumes that not everyone is similarly 
situated.205 Therefore, it is not enough for decisionmakers to treat everyone 
equally; they may need to treat subordinated groups more favorably than 
privileged groups because subordinated groups have experienced a lack of 
opportunities.206 Accordingly, the approach supports that the legal regime 
should directly redress the disparities experienced by subordinated groups.207 
Further, employer policies and decisions that reinforce hierarchy based on a 
subordinating characteristic, such as race or sex, are unlawful regardless of 
whether the policies and decisions are facially neutral.208  
In contrast to anticlassification theory, antisubordination theory is “a 
group-based perspective, in two ways.”209 The first way antisubordination 
theory is group-based is that “it focuses on society’s role in creating 
subordination.”210 The second way in which antisubordination theory is 
group-based is that it examines how the subordination “affects, or has 
affected, groups of people.”211 Because antisubordination theory is group-
 
204 Coleman, supra note 178, at 77 (quoting Samuel R. Bagnestos, Universalism and Civil 
Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2842 (2014)). 
205 Areheart, supra note 169, at 963–64. “As elaborated by Fiss and subsequent proponents, 
including Catharine MacKinnon, Charles Lawrence, Derrick Bell, Laurence Tribe, and Kenneth 
Karst, [antisubordination] is variously called the antisubordination principle, the antisubjugation 
principle, the equal citizenship principle, or the anticaste principle.” Balkin & Siegel, supra note 
168, at 9 (citing DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE (1987); KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1989); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON 
LIFE AND LAW 32–45 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN 117 (1979); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16–21, at 1043–
52 (1978); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, And Equal Protection: Reckoning With 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987)). 
206 Areheart, supra note 169, at 964. 
207 Colker, supra note 173, at 1007–08. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 1008. 
210 Id. at 1008–09. 
211 Id. at 1009. 
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based, it shifts the focus from the impact on individual workers to the impact 
on the group as a whole.212 As a result, it looks to group identity and traits to 
determine whether that identity or trait is the basis of the subordination.213 
While Title VII is primarily associated with anticlassification principles, 
it does include some antisubordination principles.214 At least four 
antisubordination provisions and policies are associated with Title VII: 
(1) “the history of discrimination faced by African Americans motivated 
Congress to pass the statute[;]” (2) affirmative action to allow “a forbidden 
trait” to “sometimes be taken into account” to remedy past subordination; 
(3) the disparate impact provisions; and (4) classifying employees to 
reasonably accommodate them to prevent subordinating behavior.215 The 
disparate impact provisions, in particular, present a model of proof that relies 
on antisubordination principles because it requires employers to address 
policies that have a discriminatory effect even if they are facially neutral.216 
The Americans with Disabilities Act217 primarily derives from 
antisubordination principles: Congress noted the history of discrimination 
against people with disabilities, the structural barriers people with disabilities 
encounter that lead to discrimination, and it requires not just equal 
opportunity but reasonable accommodation.218 Similarly, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)219 is based on antisubordination 
principles because it applies only to individuals over the age of forty whose 
employer has discriminated against them because of their age.220 And 
Congress enacted the ADEA because of a history of employers 
discriminating against older employees.221 
 
212 See id. at 1007–08. 
213 Id. at 1007–08; Areheart, supra note 169, at 963–64. 
214 Areheart, supra note 169, at 970. 
215 See id. at 970–72; see also Bornstein, supra note 169, at 542 (“Title VII recognizes both the 
anticlassification principle, in its prohibition of disparate treatment, and the antisubordination 
principle, in its prohibition of unjustified disparate impact.”). 
216 Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 1019. 
217 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327, amended by 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3533 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12102–12103 (2009)). 
218 Areheart, supra note 169, at 973–75.  
219 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012)). 
220 Areheart, supra note 169, at 972. 
221 Id. at 972–73. 
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Many scholars have argued that antisubordination principles would better 
address discrimination. 222 Because antisubordination requires courts and 
policy makers to address the structural causes of discrimination, it better 
prevents and addresses unconscious or more subtle forms of bias.223 It also 
allows courts to address actions that appear to be neutral but result in a 
discriminatory impact on subordinated groups because antisubordination’s 
goal is to address the causes of subordination.224 Importantly, it requires the 
decisionmaker to explicitly consider the subordination and society’s role in 
creating the subordination.225 In the context of racial discrimination, this 
requires that policy makers “adequately grapple with the systemic vestiges 
of slavery, Jim Crow, and racial animosity that contribute to the continued 
subordination of members of racial and ethnic minorities.”226 And it avoids 
essentializing members of subordinated groups. It instead requires that policy 
makers and decisionmakers consider the ways in which intersectionality, 





222 See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 178, at 85 (“Anti-subordination is a critical tenet of the critical 
race theory movement and has found support among constitutional law scholars and others 
committed to the law and legal institutions’ ability to not just prevent discrimination but to elevate 
the social, economic, and political positions of subordinated groups.”); Balkin & Siegel, supra note 
168, at 9 n.2 (citing scholars who write in the antisubordination tradition). 
223 Bagnestos, supra note 168, at 5–10. 
224 Areheart, supra note 169, at 971 (discussing Title VII’s disparate impact doctrine); 
Bagnestos, supra note 168, at 5–10 (discussing Title VII’s disparate impact doctrine); see also 
Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 1019 (same). 
225 Areheart, supra note 169, at 1005–06 (discussing the implications of the anticlassification 
turn in employment discrimination and its effect on the consideration of race). Areheart writes: 
even if we reach a place where racism no longer impairs the opportunities available to 
minorities, social and economic deprivations will continue to do so by reinforcing 
stereotypes and thus possibly inflaming racist predispositions. We might desire to pay 
attention to such conditions/deprivations for reasons that are non-instrumental (for 
example, that they tend to cause misery). 
 Id. 
226 Coleman, supra note 178, at 68. 
227 See id. 
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IV. THE ANTISUBORDINATION AND ANTICLASSIFICATION 
FRAMEWORKS EXACERBATE THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PROXY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY/DETERRENCE JUSTIFICATIONS  
The limits of the justifications for protecting unauthorized workers can 
be traced to or at least related to the justifications’ reliance on 
anticlassification and antisubordination principles. First, the proxy 
justification relies directly on anticlassification theory. In a sense, it is blind 
to status. It requires the court and policy makers to provide the same 
protection to unauthorized workers as to authorized workers, regardless of 
that workers’ immigration status. It also is focused on how the unlawful 
discrimination affects the individual worker. Courts are concerned with 
whether the employer discriminated against the individual worker—defined 
by whether the employer treated the unauthorized worker differently from a 
similarly situated individual based on the worker’s race, gender, national 
origin, color, or religion.228  
The McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis is an example of how 
the Court has operationalized anticlassificationist principles.229 To 
demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination where there is no direct 
evidence of discrimination, the employee must show that (1) the employee 
was qualified for the position; (2) that the employee belonged to a protected 
category; (3) the employer failed to promote or hire the employee, or 
disciplined or fired the employee; and (4) the employer treated someone not 
in the protected category more favorably or left the position open.230 If the 
employee demonstrates the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
employer to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.231 
At that point, the employee must show that the employer’s proffered reason 
was pretextual.232 The McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis is 
anticlassificationist on its face as it explicitly names the wrong as treating an 
 
228 See, e.g., EEOC v. Phase 2 Invs., Inc., 310 Fed. Supp. 3d 550, 576 (D. Md. 2018) (“[Title 
VII] authorized suits against employers for discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, 
religion or sex. It did not restrict the class of persons who could bring such suits by citizenship or 
immigration status.”). 
229 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
230 Id. at 802. 
231 Id. at 802–03. 
232 Id. at 804. 
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employee differently based on the employee’s status and views the goal of 
Title VII as achieving a race-neutral workplace.233 
This works against unauthorized workers because a worker must be 
similarly situated to other workers—and unauthorized workers are differently 
situated from authorized workers with respect to their immigration status. For 
example, in Egbuna v. Time-Life Libs., Inc., the Fourth Circuit emphasized 
the unauthorized status of an employee when it decided the employee could 
not assert a prima facie case of employment discrimination.234 The employee 
had previously worked for the company and resigned from his job because 
he planned to return to his home country.235 During his employment, his visa 
had expired, but the company did not note its expiration.236 After the 
employee decided not to return to his home country, he asked the company 
to reinstate him into his job.237 The employee alleged that the company had 
agreed to hire him but then rescinded the offer because the company 
discovered he had cooperated with the EEOC in a sexual harassment 
investigation.238 
In Egbuna, the Fourth Circuit used the anticlassification principles 
announced in McDonnell-Douglas to determine that the employee’s lack of 
work authorization meant that he was unqualified for the position and ended 
its inquiry at step one of the prima facie case.239 As the dissent pointed out, 
the employer did not find out that the employee was unauthorized until after 
it had made its decision.240 So the majority misapplied the after-acquired 
evidence doctrine.241 The result is that even when an employer has 
intentionally discriminated against an employee, it can avoid any liability 
based on the employee’s unauthorized status. This can be traced to 
 
233 Id. at 801 (“[Title VII’s goals involve] societal as well as personal interests on both sides of 
this equation. The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is 
efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and 
personnel decisions”) (emphasis added). 
234 Egbuna v. Time-Life Libs., Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 1998). 
235 Id. at 185. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. at 186. 
239 Id. at 188. 
240 Id. at 189 (Ervin, J., dissenting). 
241 Id. 
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antidiscrimination law’s reliance on the anticlassification principle of treating 
similarly situated individuals equally. 
The proxy justification’s reliance on anticlassification theory’s status-
neutral and individually-focused principles leads to other justification’s 
failures. Although courts are blind to the workers’ status in determining 
whether workers can sue employers who violate Title VII, that blindness can 
mean that policy makers do not have to consider whether unauthorized 
workers “in society are subordinated, or, if so, how bad the subordination has 
been.”242 This can leave unanswered the role that the workers’ status played 
in making the worker more vulnerable. It also increases the likelihood that 
the focus will remain on individual workers and how they should reform to 
comply with immigration laws, rather than a change to the policies and 
structures that have led to the vulnerability.243 
For example, in EEOC v. Switching Systems Division of Rockwell 
International, Corp., the employer terminated a group of employees who had 
falsely stated on their employment application that they were United States 
citizens or provided incorrect social security numbers.244 The company’s 
policies set out offenses that could subject an employee to discipline or 
termination, which included falsifying employment applications or 
questionnaires.245 At the time that the company fired the workers, some had 
subsequently obtained immigration status.246 Two other employees who had 
provided false information were only disciplined—one was a United States 
citizen and the other’s nationality was unknown.247 The EEOC alleged that 
the company fired the immigrant employees because of their national 
origin.248 In rejecting the EEOC’s claim, the court relied on the employees’ 
unauthorized status at the time of their application to shift blame for the 
decision from the employee to the employer, “because of [the employee’s] 
 
242 Areheart, supra note 169, at 999 (quoting Jack M. Balkin, Plessy Brown, and Grutter: A 
Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1711 (2005)). 
243 Cf. Sharpless, supra note 117, at 707–08 (describing the limitations of respectability politics 
and its role in “reinforc[ing] and reproduc[ing] existing social and economic inequalities in our 
society”). 
244 EEOC v. Switching Sys. Div. of Rockwell Int’l, Corp., 783 F. Supp. 369, 370 (N.D. Ill. 
1992). 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 370–71. 
247 Id. at 371. 
248 Id. at 369–70. 
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lack of citizenship status, [she] was compelled to falsify information in order 
to secure employment. If [she] had been a United States citizen when she 
made application, then presumably she would not have falsified her 
application, and she would still have a job with defendant.”249 
Further, anticlassification’s status-neutral and individually focused 
principles leave unexamined the structural causes of the discrimination the 
worker suffered: “the mainstream perception becomes that the exploitation 
of immigrant workers is entirely the result of private actions.”250 It also can 
exacerbate the discrimination the worker may experience as a result of the 
workers’ statutorily protected class, especially race, gender, and national 
origin.  
And, as described above, the failure to account for those intersections can 
limit access to remedies.251 Because unauthorized workers forego remedies 
to avoid discovery into their immigration status, it also means that courts 
often leave unexamined the role the employer played in creating the 
vulnerability.252 That can impact what workers can recover in punitive 
damages.253 
Second, the employer accountability justification implicates 
anticlassification’s focus on “invidious motivations.” Inclusion of 
unauthorized workers in the coverage of federal antidiscrimination laws is 
justified only when the employer intentionally discriminates on the basis of 
a protected characteristic. This limits the full application of federal 
antidiscrimination laws with respect to unauthorized workers. It calls into 
question, not just employers’ motivations, but also whether unauthorized 
workers are at fault. Kathleen Kim has shown how this framing results in a 
belief that the worker is complicit in the unauthorized work: “the worker’s 
affirmative wrongdoing evidence[s] his collusion in the unlawful 
employment arrangement, thereby precluding him from obtaining relief.”254 
Because the theory looks at the motivations of employers, it invites courts to 
also look at the motivations of workers. 
 
249 Id. at 375. 
250 Lee, supra note 8, at 1100. 
251 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
252 Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 968–70 
(arguing that employers rely on the under-enforcement of workplace laws and over-enforcement of 
immigration laws to cultivate an exploitable workforce made up of primarily unauthorized workers). 
253 Punitive damages are available to a Title VII plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). 
254 Kim, supra note 3, at 1580. 
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An example of this appears in Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Mississippi, 
LLC.255 The Fifth Circuit determined that a group of presumptively 
unauthorized workers’ pending U-visa applications were probative of the 
workers’ motives behind reporting workplace harassment to the EEOC.256 
Noncitizens who are the victim of a crime, provide assistance or who are 
willing to provide assistance to a law enforcement agency investigating or 
prosecuting the crime, and who have suffered substantial physical or mental 
abuse as a result of the crime can apply for a U-visa.257 The workers in the 
poultry plant alleged action that would not only be sexual and racial 
harassment under Title VII but also would violate criminal laws: 
Supervisors allegedly groped female workers, and in some cases 
assaulted them more violently; offered female workers money or promotions 
for sex; made sexist and racist comments; punched, elbowed, and otherwise 
physically abused workers of both sexes; and demanded money from them in 
exchange for permission for bathroom breaks, sick leave, and transfers to 
other positions. . . . When workers complained or resisted, [company] 
managers allegedly ignored them, and some debone supervisors allegedly 
retaliated by docking their pay; demoting, reassigning, or firing them; and 
threatening to physically harm them or have them arrested or deported.258 
While the court acknowledged that “substantial evidence suggests that 
serious abuse is all too common in many industries reliant on immigrant 
workers, including the modern-day poultry industry[,]” it did not form a 
significant part of the court’s reasoning, nor did the court state how the 
workers’ unauthorized status could have led to the discrimination.259 Instead, 
the court elided the status, mentioning only “immigrant” workers, which is 
closely associated with protected characteristics under Title VII, national 
origin, and race/ethnicity.260 And when it mentioned the workers’ 
unauthorized status, it focused on their compliance with immigration laws, 
writing: “we find it plausible that some undocumented immigrants might be 
 
255 Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC., 838 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2016). 
256 Id. at 558–59. The Court ultimately reversed the order that required the EEOC to turn over 
discovery related to the U-visas because it would harm the public interest (not the individual 
worker’s interests), but still found that the individual workers would have to turn over anonymized 
U- visa applications. Id. at 563–64.  
257 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012). 
258 Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 544–45. 
259 Id. at 558. 
260 Id. 
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tempted to stretch the truth in order to obtain lawful status” despite noting 
the multiple checks on fraud in the U-visa process.261 
Unfortunately, antisubordination theory does not provide a complete 
foundation for including unauthorized workers in antidiscrimination law’s 
protections. First, antisubordination theory, out of necessity, emphasizes the 
subordinated status of groups of workers. And that can require advocates to 
portray subordinated workers as powerless in ways that conflict with 
workers’ own perceptions of themselves and lived experiences.262 This is not 
to say that workers do, in fact, lack autonomy and agency. Indeed, researchers 
have documented the ways in which noncitizens’ individual precarity has 
spurred collective action that propels greater agency.263 Other scholars have 
described the ways in which claim-making can empower workers because it 
erases one of the contributors to subordination, silence.264 Instead, the 
narrative that advocates sometimes must adopt to position their clients as 
victims of unscrupulous employers to get buy-in from the decisionmaker can 
exacerbate the effect that the accountability and deterrence justification has 
 
261 Id. at 558–59. 
262 See, e.g., Sarah Morando Lakhani, Producing Immigrant Victims’ “Right” to Legal Status 
and the Management of Uncertainty, 38 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 442, 453–60 (2013) (describing 
the challenge for advocates in creating “clean victim” narratives in which the client is the subject of 
“nonmutual control” by their abusers so that unauthorized immigrant clients can receive U-visas 
based on their status as victims of crime).  
 Mary Anne Case has also argued that antisubordination’s focus on groups rather than individual 
effects could lead some courts and policy makers to revert to “a separate but equal” approach to 
resolving discrimination. She asserts that one of the main proponents of the antisubordination strand 
in the constitutional law of sex discrimination was Justice Rehnquist. Case, supra note 169, at 1475. 
He objected to striking down laws just because they classify women differently from men but noted 
that the law must subordinate women for it to count as unlawful sex discrimination. Id. As Case 
notes, the problem with Rehnquist’s approach is that it leads to a “vision of separate (but equal) 
spheres” that ignores the demeaning and subordinating effect of insisting that “individuals of either 
sex” must match the stereotype associated with their sex. Id. This is because it “is inconsistent with 
the equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, National and State, [and] the personal liberty 
enjoyed by everyone within the United States.” Id. at 1476 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 555 (Harlan, J. dissenting), overruled by, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
263 Marcel Paret & Shannon Gleeson, Precarity and Agency Through A Migration Lens, 20 
CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 277 (2016). 
264 Llezlie Green Coleman, Exploited at the Intersection: A Critical Race Feminist Analysis of 
Undocumented Latina Workers and the Role of the Private Attorney General, 22 VA. J. OF SOCIAL 
POL’Y & THE LAW 397 (2015). 
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of casting unauthorized workers as subservient workers who are there for 
employers to exploit.265 
A second major drawback of antisubordination theory is that it requires 
policy makers to recognize subordinated groups as worthy of protection. Ira 
Katzelson provides an example of this drawback in the context of the New 
Deal workplace laws—the Fair Labor Standards Act and National Labor 
Relations Act.266 Initially southern legislators supported the laws because 
they did not require southern legislators to recognize the subordinated status 
of most African American workers, but their support waned once Congress 
tried to include African Americans in the New Deal laws’ coverage.267 
Katzelson shows that the New Deal workplace laws successfully made it 
through Congress because even though there was little union presence in the 
South, “[t]he South was willing to support [the Democratic industrial 
constituencies’] wishes provided these statutes did not threaten Jim Crow.  
So southern members traded their votes for the exclusion of farmworkers and 
maids, the most widespread black categories of employment, from the 
protections offered by these statutes.”268 Katzelson traces the decline in 
Southern legislators’ support for labor laws as evidenced in the Labor-
Management Relations Act, in part, to labor unions’ “increasing, unexpected 
success in the South” and to non-Southern new deal liberals’ press for “a 
more expansive federal administration to advance labor interests without 
relenting where race intersected with labor[.]”269 Further, Katzelson explains 
that Southern legislators “now had good reason to fear that labor organizing 
might fuel civil rights activism.”270  
Scholars have noted similar patterns in advocating for immigrant 
rights.271 Maria Olivares has described the limits of adopting such rhetoric to 
argue for noncitizen rights.272 She attributes the failure of interest 
 
265 See discussion supra Part II.B.; Lakhani, supra note 262, at 453–60. 
266 IRA KATZELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF 
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 55 (2005). 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 67–68. 
270 Id. at 68. 
271 See, e.g., Mariela Olivares, Narrative Reform Dilemmas, 82 MO. L. REV. 1089, 1136 (2017). 
272 Id. at 1136 (quoting Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1349 
(1988)). 
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convergence as the primary cause because the majority perpetually views 
noncitizens as outsiders whose interests do not match those of the majority: 
“[a]s long as immigrants remain outsiders and their interests do not 
adequately converge with the interests of the majority . . . traditional reform 
frameworks are futile.”273 The rhetoric about immigrants in general positions 
them as outsiders whose interests are different from U.S. citizens.274 When 
advocates use the proxy justification to argue that Title VII and other 
antidiscrimination laws to protect unauthorized workers, the justification 
breaks down because unauthorized workers do differ from their authorized 
counterparts.275 And the majority, at least for now, is not interested in 
recognizing that difference as one that deserves protection.276 Thus, even 
though being unauthorized does make it more likely that workers will face 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, the 
unauthorized part of the workers’ identity makes it less likely that policy 
makers and courts will acknowledge the subordination. 
Third, courts and policy makers may resist relying on antisubordination 
principles because they view it as unfair to make employers responsible for 
implementing change when the problem stems from larger societal 
structures.277 For example, even though the ADA is based on 
antisubordination principles, courts have been reluctant to require employers 
to provide accessible transportation despite that it would not cause an undue 
burden on employers.278 Courts’ reluctance to hold employers responsible for 
problems they view as societal, means that the accountability/deterrence 
justification provides a way for courts to engage in complicity framing to 
assign fault not to the employer but to the worker.279 
Finally, antisubordination historically has relied on immutability as part 
of the justification for protection, and that can create challenges for workers 
who have a characteristic, such as lack of immigration status, that society 




275 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
276 See discussion of IRCA supra Part I. 
277 Bagnestos, supra note 168, at 42–43. 
278 Id. at 43. 
279 See, e.g., Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding 
that even if the employer acted wrongly by subjecting the employee to sexual harassment and 
retaliation, the employee could not claim backpay because he was unauthorized). 
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protected statuses, Trina Jones outlines four factors on which courts have 
relied to determine protected status: “(1) immutability; (2) visibility; (3) 
relevancy; and (4) a pervasive history of discrimination.”280 With respect to 
immutability in the context of employment discrimination, Owen Fiss 
identifies it as one of the principle drivers of “the sense of unfairness 
engendered by the [use of race] as the basis of an employment decision.”281 
Fiss points out that immutability is related to the “absence of individual 
control.”282 It is unfair to judge individuals on something that is outside of 
their control because society values the idea that individual control “provides 
the prospect for upward mobility.”283 This idea allows society to rationalize 
“the unequal distribution of status and wealth among people in the 
society.”284 Failure becomes a problem within an individual’s own control.285 
Immutability’s service to the idea of individual control also assumes that “the 
allocation of scarce employment opportunities represent, to some extent, a 
reward.”286 Though scholars have challenged these factors, especially 
immutability and visibility, courts and policy makers continue to use them as 
an analytical tool.287  
In sum, anticlassification and antisubordination theories reinforce the 
limits of the justifications immigration advocates and scholars have put 
forward as reasons to include unauthorized workers within the protection of 
federal antidiscrimination law. They lead to limited remedies and more 
vulnerability in the workplace. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has described the ways in which the main justifications for 
protecting unauthorized workers have failed to provide full protection. Those 
justifications rest on advocates and scholars’ efforts to distinguish federal 
antidiscrimination plaintiffs from the unauthorized worker in Hoffman. It has 
 
280 Jones, supra note 188, at 63 (citing Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 146 (2011)). 
281 Fiss, supra note 168, at 241. The other attribute Fiss identified was relevancy—i.e., “race is 






287 Jones, supra note 188, at 63.  
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meant that unauthorized workers are positioned as proxies for United States 
workers and workers with authorization. It also has led advocates to 
emphasize employers’ lawbreaking and the need to hold them accountable to 
deter future violations. These justifications have provided some protection 
for unauthorized workers. But they have led to limits on remedies and fed 
into harmful stereotypes about unauthorized workers. But it is not only these 
justifications that have resulted in this harm.  
This article has highlighted how the two main antidiscrimination 
frameworks exacerbate the limitations of justifications used to protect 
unauthorized workers. Anticlassification theory’s status-neutral and 
individually-focused principles intensify the differences between authorized 
workers and their authorized colleagues that already limit full remedy under 
the proxy justification. Similarly, anticlassification’s status-neutral and 
individually-focused principles reinforce harmful stereotypes that lead to 
complicity framing. Antisubordination’s emphasis on membership in a 
subordinated group, antisubordination’s need for majority buy-in, and 
antisubordination’s historical reliance on immutability also contribute to the 
accountability/deterrence justification’s amplification of unauthorized 
workers’ vulnerability.  
While this article has focused on unauthorized workers’ inability to 
achieve full remedy under federal antidiscrimination law, anticlassification 
and antisubordination’s limitations also likely contribute to other vulnerable 
workers’ inability to achieve full remedy under antidiscrimination laws due 
to imperfect proxies. For example, formerly incarcerated individuals face 
challenges similar to unauthorized workers when it comes to asserting Title 
VII race discrimination claims. They are often subject to complicity 
framing288 and that could be due to anticlassification’s focus on the individual 
claimant. Caregivers, too, have difficulty fitting their claims into the existing 
framework for gender discrimination claims under Title VII.289 Thus, this 
article’s insights on the failures of anticlassification and antisubordination 
principles in the context of the unauthorized workplace could also provide 
 
288 Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, And 
Employment Discrimination in The Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 920–27 (2014) 
(describing the bars to claims-making under Title VII that formerly incarcerated individuals face).  
289 Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s 
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 371 (2001); see also Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the 
Courtroom: The Growing Trend of Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 171 
(2006) (describing increased litigation under Title VII involving caregivers). 
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insights for scholars and advocates addressing the challenges other 
vulnerable workers face. 
  
 
